The enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 triggered a relatively large and rapid migration inflow into Wales which was concentrated into narrow areas and occupations. As this inflow was larger and faster than anticipated, it arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the literature. This helps to some extent to circumvent identification issues arising from simultaneity bias which usually pose difficulties when estimating the effect of migration inflows on the labour market. We found little evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in Wales between 2004 and 2006. In particular, we found no evidence of an adverse impact on young, female or low-skilled claimant unemployment and no evidence of an adverse impact on the wages of the low-paid. If anything, we found a positive effect on the wages of higher paid workers and some weak evidence of a potentially favourable impact on claimant unemployment.
Introduction
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) in May 2004 granted workers from ten accession countries free movement within the union. This triggered a relatively large and rapid migration inflow into Wales which was concentrated into narrow areas and occupations. As Wales has historically experienced both net out-migration of younger people and in-migration of older people, inflows of younger workers has been seen as one solution to problems caused by an ageing workforce .
Thus, the analysis of the effects of the recent accession migration inflow on the Welsh labour market provides a particularly interesting case study. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate whether this increase in the claimant unemployment was due to the accession migration inflow. More specifically, we estimate the effect of the accession inflow on claimant unemployment and on the distribution of wages using micro level monthly WRS and JSA data, as well as data from the Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (ASHE) between 2004 and 2006 . This new and large source of data on migration combined with data on claimant unemployment permits disaggregation at fine (district and month) levels and offers invaluable insights into the Welsh labour market.
Given that the paucity of suitable data is one of the main reasons for scarce evidence on the effects of migration, this paper helps to fill a gap in the migration literature for Wales and the UK, which is very limited Manacorda et al. 2006; Lemos and Portes 2008; Drinkwater et al. 2009 are some of the few) -specially so on the effects of the recent EU enlargement. Furthermore, this paper helps to inform policymaking on the face of further EU enlargement. It is especially opportune, given the current heated public debate on migration -and in particular on migration from current and future accession countries.
Another contribution of this paper is that the nature of the accession migration helps to some extent to circumvent identification issues arising from simultaneity bias which 1 usually pose difficulties when estimating the effect of migration inflows on the labour market. One complicating identification issue is that if natives respond to the migration inflow by moving away from a particular area or occupation, then potential adverse effects on that labour market may be offset. Another complicating identification issue is that if migrants respond to specific demand conditions by self-selecting into particularly booming areas or occupations, once again potential adverse effects on that labour market may be offset. The nature of the accession migration, however, was such that these responses from both natives and migrants might have been sufficiently lagged to allow identification of adverse wages and unemployment effects. That is because the accession inflow was substantially larger and faster than anticipated (see Dustmann et al. 2003 for forecasts), and thus arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the literature.
We found little evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in Wales between 2004 and 2006 . In particular, we found no evidence of an adverse impact on young, female or low-skilled claimant unemployment and no evidence of an adverse impact on the wages of the low-paid. If anything, we found a positive effect on the wages of higher paid workers and some weak evidence of a potentially favourable impact on claimant unemployment. Our results are robust to a number of specification checks and are in line with other results in the literature. 1 Our results are also in line with standard theory, which predicts adverse wages and/or employment effects following a migration inflow that is unbalanced across areas or skills.
We found evidence that higher paid (complement) workers had larger, positive and significant wage increases, whereas lower paid (competing) workers had smaller and insignificant wage increases. One interpretation here is that, relative to higher paid workers, lower paid workers had less favourable (though not adverse) wage increases.
Incidentally, more adverse wage effects for lower paid (competing) workers may have been potentially mitigated or offset because they were protected by a concurrently increasing minimum wage. 1 Our results are in line with evidence in the international (mainly US) literature of little or no effect on employment and wages (Chiswick 1980; Grossman 1982; Card 1990 Card , 2005 Card and 2007 Altonji and Card 1991; Pischke and Velling 1997; Friedberg 2001; Manacorda et al. 2006; Carrasco et al. 2008) , though in contrast with other evidence of more adverse effects (Borjas 2003 and 2006; Angrist and Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007) . As we discuss in Sections 3 and 4, the disagreement in the literature is underlined by an ongoing debate on identification issues arising from natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection (see for example Chiswick 1991; Borjas 1999; Card 2001 ).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data.
In Section 3 we discuss our empirical model of unemployment. In Section 4 we carefully discuss our empirical approach and several associated identification issues. In Section 5 we discuss our empirical model of wages. In Section 6 we summarise and conclude.
Data

Sources
The migration data we use is from the WRS, the unemployment data is from the JSA, and the wages data is from the ASHE. We discuss each in turn.
In order to work in the UK for a month or longer, accession nationals are obliged to register on the Home Office administered Worker Registration Scheme (WRS).
Registration, in addition to being a legal requirement for accession migrants, offers 2 The trend shows a seasonal pattern where numbers peak in the summer and plunge in the winter. This trend is also observed in the WRS data (see Figure 3 ). Furthermore, a downwards trend can be observed from 2008 onwards. 3 The migrant headcount is relatively small for Wales when compared with other parts of the UK (also see Figure 3 ). This is also illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows that Wales received a smaller migration inflow relative to its working age population than other parts of the UK.
The WRS data is rich, large, frequent and timely. It records nationality, address, age, 2 The Home Office (2006) uses "application date" and the UK Border Agency uses application "approval date" to aggregate the data, whereas Gilpin et al. (2006) use "entry date". As the typical migrant enters the UK, finds a job, and then applies to the WRS, we use "start of work date" to best capture labour market effects and to skew from identification issues associated to using "entry date" or "application date". 3 In our regression analysis in Sections 3 to 5 we use WRS data from May 2004 to May 2006, whereas in some of our descriptive analysis in Section 2 we also use UK Border Agency data from May 2004 to December 2008. This is primarily because, although our first request for WRS and JSA monthly micro level data was successful in 2007, our second request in 2009 was not. Therefore, to gather a sense of more recent descriptive figures we use quarterly UK Border Agency data, which displays lower overall numbers. In addition to exploiting the better quality of the WRS data, further arguments for restricting the regression analysis to the first two years only are that: in the longer run labour markets adjust (which might dilute potentially adverse effects) (Altonji and Card 1991; ; and in the longer run labour markets are hit by other shocks (which makes identification of migration effects more challenging).
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start and end dates. It does not, however, record nationality. 
Descriptive Analysis
Within Wales, WRS migrants are concentrated in five main districts, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 : Newport, Cardiff, Carmarthenshire, Wrexham and Flintshire.
These districts form two clusters of relatively bigger cities bordering England (except for Carmarthenshire, which is in West Wales and is predominantly rural) that are historically more associated with migration and have a long term trend of out-migration . These clusters are also traditionally linked to manufacturing, though the service sector has been growing in Newport and Cardiff. The left panel of Figure 5 shows that apart from Cardiff, these are not areas of particularly high or low unemployment. (Within Cardiff, it is possible that WRS migrants shun away from high or low unemployment areas too.)
Given the disproportionate numbers of WRS migrants and claimants in Cardiff, and to a lesser extent in the other four districts, it is likely that both groups compete for the same jobs and therefore two obvious questions arise. The first question is whether migrants pushed natives out of their jobs or made it harder for them to go back into jobs in these districts. The right panel of Figure 5 shows a continuing inflow of migrants and an upwards trend on the number of claimants in these areas. Table 1 shows that wages grew strongly in the bottom half of the distribution during the whole period -this wage growth was stronger in Wales than in the UK. This again provides little evidence of an adverse association between WRS migration and wages growth in Wales. Figure 6 shows that WRS migrants are concentrated in elementary (36%) and machine operative (49%) occupations, and in the manufacturing (48%) and the distribution hotels and restaurants (23%) sectors (see Table 1 ). 6 Once again, given the disproportionate numbers of WRS migrants and claimants in these occupations, it is likely that both groups compete for the same jobs. The obvious question is again whether migrants pushed natives out of, or made it harder for them to go back into jobs in these occupations. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that despite the continuing inflow of migrants into machine operatives The right panel of Figure 7 also shows a continuing inflow of migrants into elementary occupations, where they were probably more able to find jobs because of language or other labour market barriers (Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 2001; Drinkwater et al. 2009 ).
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This is also the usual occupation for most claimants (34%) and Figure 7 shows that some of them switched from looking for jobs in (usual) elementary to other (sought) occupations.
The switch could be because natives were pushed out of their jobs, which would suggest some evidence of an adverse association between WRS migration and claimant unemployment in elementary occupations. However, the switch could also be because of other factors, including occupational progression, sectoral or occupational shocks, macro shocks, etc., which we account for in our empirical models in Sections 3 to 5. An example of such shocks, as discussed above, is the claimant unemployment increase across all occupations in early 2006, which hints at macro effects in addition to any WRS migration effects.
The top left panel of Figure 
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occupations and districts offering clear counterfactuals. There is some weak evidence that in these main occupations and locations the inflow might be associated with adverse unemployment effects, though less evidence that it might be associated with adverse wage effects. We exploit the variation in these occupation and location choices across months to separately identify the effect of the migration shock from the effect of other supply and demand shocks on claimant unemployment and wages in our empirical models, as we discuss in Sections 3 to 5.
Unemployment Effects
Using a reduced form equation grounded on standard theory (see for example Borjas 1999; Card 2001; , we estimate the effect of the WRS migration inflow on claimant unemployment netflow in Wales: As we estimate Equation 1 in first-difference, district fixed effects were differenced out.
This enables us to separate the effect of district specific factors, which might make a particular district more attractive to migrants or natives or both (such as more schools, more housing, higher wages, etc.), from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment. We model time fixed effects using 24 month-year dummies. This enables us to separate the effect of other macro shocks (such as seasonal shocks, national and international shocks, etc.) from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment.
We also control for supply and demand shifters. This enables us to separate the effect of supply and demand shocks from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment.
Controls in it X include the proportion of the total population who are women, young (those between 18 and 24 years of age), and ethnic minorities and migrants from outside the A8 countries. This enables us to control for higher unemployment in a particular district due to the presence of relatively more women, young, minorities or other migrants -which are groups who often experience high unemployment. Further controls include the lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and parents (along with average number of children). We also control for the lagged average hours worked by WRS migrants to account for potentially higher claimant unemployment in districts where migrants work longer hours (which may increase substitutability). We also include the lagged proportion of WRS migrants in elementary and machine operative occupations to control for occupation-district specific shocks affecting claimant unemployment. Finally, we include the lagged proportion of unemployed who are women and young, and lagged average claim duration. Lagged claim duration accounts for higher unemployment in districts with historically long spells of unemployment; it also alleviates problems arising from serial correlation in the residuals and it can be interpreted as a measure of labour demand.
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We perform a Generalized Least Square (GLS) correction to account for the relative importance of each district and for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation. Also, we correct the standard errors for serial correlation across and within districts. 10 Given such stringent specifications, and given the clear counterfactuals discussed in Section 2.2, we argue that the remaining variation in the claimant unemployment rate is likely due to changes in the WRS migration inflow -and this ensures the identification of n  . Table 2 shows an insignificant 0.024 (GLS) estimate when we control for district fixed effects.
Row 3 shows an insignificant 0.006 estimate when we control for month-year fixed effects.
Row 4 shows an insignificant 0.012 estimate when we control for other supply and demand shocks (which are, in the main, significant and of the expected sign here as well as in the remainder models in the paper). These estimates are numerically close to zero and statistically indifferent from zero. Thus, our results suggest little evidence of adverse 9 claimant unemployment effects at the district level.
4. Identification
Simultaneity Bias
Two main sources of endogeneity could be biasing our n  estimates in Section 3:
natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection. On the one hand, potentially more adverse effects on a particular district that received a migration inflow might be offset if natives avoid competing with migrants by moving away to other districts. On the other hand, potentially more adverse effects on a particular district that received a migration inflow might be offset if migrants deliberately self-selected into booming districts. Therefore, the extent to which any adverse unemployment effects can be identified depends on how mobile natives are across districts in response to migration inflows and on how able migrants are to self-select into booming districts.
As the WRS migration shock was substantially larger and faster than anticipated (see Dustmann et al. 2003 for forecasts), both natives' and migrants' responses -through, respectively, mobility out of and self-selection into specific districts -might have been sufficiently lagged to allow identification of adverse labour market effects. That is, the WRS inflow arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the literature (also see Card 1990 and Hunt 1992; Carrington and Lima 1996; Friedberg 2001) . Because of this, we argue that any simultaneity bias is not too severe in our estimates in Section 3.
One way to check the extent of any such a bias in our estimates is to explicitly control for natives' mobility in Equation 1. This allows us to separate the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment from the effect of natives moving away from (or refraining to move into) a district. In other words, we build, to some extent, a counterfactual of how mobile natives would have been in the absence of the migration inflow. Therefore, this helps to correct for both natives' mobility (omitted variable) bias and migrants' self selection (omitted variable) bias. Rows 5 and 6 of Panel A of Table 2 show that, controlling for respectively lagged working age population growth and native netflow rate does not alter the estimates qualitatively: the estimates remain insignificant and are, respectively, 0.024 and 0.017
(compare with row 4). This offers little evidence that natives' mobility offset potentially more adverse claimant unemployment effects.
Aggregation Level
Another way to check the extent of any natives' mobility bias in our estimates in Sections 3 and 4.1 is to aggregate the data at broader levels. Ideally the level of data aggregation should conform to the actual radius of job search for natives competing with migrants. However, as the boundaries of the actual radius of job search for natives are an empirical matter, we experiment with several levels of aggregation (i.e. several degrees of natives' mobility), allowing the search to take place on ever wider labour markets (Borjas 2006) . We start with a Twenty-Two-Way district aggregation, followed by a Seven-Way and a Three-Way district aggregation. 12 This allows us to assess whether natives are district-bound or whether they are mobile across (nearby) districts. If natives' mobility is not exacerbated by the migration inflow, estimates at the three different levels of aggregation should not differ much, as we now explain in detail.
In Sections 3 and 4.1 we assumed that there are 22 closed labour markets in Wales (i.e. 22 x 24 cells). While districts are unlikely to exactly coincide with local labour markets, they may represent a fairly realistic practical radius of job search for the low-skilled.
Because WRS migrants concentrate in low-paid jobs, they compete with low-skilled natives, who are less mobile as moving costs might be prohibitive. This effectively means 11 We use three groups: those with a degree or above, those with GCSE or below, and those in between. The last was omitted in alternative robustness checks, which did not qualitatively alter the main results. 12 We start with the 22 Unitary Authorities districts defined by the ONS (2003) that they compete in a relatively more closed market. 13 We then allow natives further mobility by assuming that there are seven [and then three] independent and closed labour markets in Wales (i.e. 7 [3] x 24 cells). Natives can now respond to the WRS inflow by moving or commuting within seven broader labour markets, instead of being locked into 22 narrowly defined independent labour markets. The underlying assumption is that the Three-Way is realistically a more closed labour market than the Seven-Way, which is realistically a more closed labour market than the TwentyTwo-Way aggregation. Thus, if natives are relatively district-bound, then estimates at the three different levels of aggregation should not differ much. That is because the natives' mobility bias is larger the greater the degree of natives' mobility (Borjas 2006) . Our final level of aggregation is the national-occupation level, as we discuss in Section 4.4, which scrapes all boundaries allowing natives mobility within a fully closed national labour market.
In contrast with the estimates in Panel A of Table 2 , the estimates in Panels B and C turn negative, though they are only significant at the broadest level of aggregation in panel C. This again suggests little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects.
The estimates are larger the broader the aggregation level, offering, perhaps tentatively, some weak evidence that natives' mobility in response to migrants' inflow has a favourable (not adverse) effect on unemployment. Nonetheless care should be taken here, as although larger estimates might be expected at wider aggregation levels as a result of theoretical predictions regarding natives' mobility (Borjas 2003 and 2006) , they might also be expected as a result of modelling choices (Peri and Sparber 2008) . One example is that three area dummies do not control for as many area specific shocks as 22 area dummies do, which may result in a larger n  estimate in panel C than in panel A (or B). Moreover, serial correlation is more of a concern in more aggregate data, which again could result in a 
Robustness Checks
The implicit assumption so far is that all WRS migrants compete with all natives in each district, which may not be realistic. This is because the vast majority of WRS migrants do not compete with highly skilled natives. We relax this by assuming that WRS migrants are only substitutes for low-skilled natives (not for high-skilled) within each district. We also experiment with other vulnerable groups, such as female and young natives. Here, the assumption is that WRS migrants are only substitutes for female (young) natives within each district.
By restricting our sample to specific demographic groups we further check the robustness of our earlier estimates. The idea here is that our earlier estimates are for the entire pool of unemployed workers, which might be diluting more adverse effects for low wage workers (Altonji and Card 1991) . We thus re-estimate Equation 1 for three groups, in turn: low-skilled (those in elementary occupations), young (those between 18 and 24 years of age) and women. These are workers likely to be competing directly with WRS migrants (see Section 2). Table 2 ). This suggests, if anything, a less adverse effect for the low-skilled at the district level. The estimate is less negative, but insignificant, when allowing low-skilled workers to search for jobs at broader aggregation levels. Row 2
shows that for young workers the estimates are again most negative at the broadest aggregation level, but it is never significant. The same is true for female workers. This offers little evidence that migrants are substitutes for low-skilled, young or female natives.
Thus, our main conclusion from before of little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects is maintained.
National and Occupational Level
Another way to relax the assumption that all WRS migrants compete with all natives is to assume that low-skilled (high-skilled) WRS migrants compete with low-skilled (highskilled) natives in a national market. That is, we aggregate the data across occupations (i.e. 9 x 24 cells) and assume that migrants and natives are only substitutes within occupations.
Stratification across occupations -as opposed to stratification across districts -is fruitful because migrants and natives compete more directly within occupations and because bias arising from natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection is less of a concern across occupations. Furthermore, unless natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection bias manifest in exactly the same way across areas and occupations, aggregation across occupations is a further check on the robustness of our earlier estimates.
On the one hand, since WRS migrants are relatively well educated, yet overwhelmingly concentrated into low skilled occupations, this suggests occupational downgrading. This happens when language or labour market barriers prevent migrants to immediately selfselect into more favourable occupations (also see Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 2001 ). Thus, because the WRS inflow was much larger and faster than anticipated, and because it was heavily concentrated into low skilled occupations, concerns about migrants'
self-selection bias are reduced. On the other hand, since immediate natives' mobility away from low skilled occupations is limited because it requires retraining (also see Friedberg 2001; Borjas 2003) , then these occupations constitute a relatively closed market. (Some limited mobility here derives from occupational progression, which we control for in our regression models.) Thus, because the accession inflow was much larger and faster than anticipated, and because it was heavily concentrated into low skilled occupations, concerns about natives' mobility bias are also reduced.
We therefore re-estimate Equation 1 Our results again suggest little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects. This is in contrast with Borjas (2006) , where more adverse effects were found at wider aggregation levels. Although our results were also successively larger the broader the aggregation level in Table 2 , they are smaller at the national level in Table 4 -and they are, if anything, less (not more) adverse at the broadest aggregation level (see Section 4.1).
Summary
We stratified labour markets in various dimensions (across districts, counties, regions, occupations) and for several demographic groups (low-skilled, young and female) to test alternative assumptions on labour substitutability between migrants and natives. In other words, we considered several alternative local labour markets where migrants might be affecting natives. That is, we modified, in several alternative ways, our assumptions on labour substitutability between migrants and natives. Yet, our estimates were reassuringly small and in the main insignificant across a number of specifications, sub-samples and estimation methods and were not sensitive to the counterfactual underlying each model. estimating comparable models for the UK using the same sample data. reported insignificant employment and unemployment effects using LFS data for the 1980s and 1990s. 15 We argue that any remaining endogeneity bias is not very large. Firstly, the WRS migration inflow was a large, rapid, concentrated supply shock resulting mainly from political events. More crucially, the WRS inflow was a shock substantially larger and faster than anticipated, and thus more exogenous than most shocks studied in the literature. As a result, natives' and migrants' responses might have been sufficiently lagged and this reduces concerns of simultaneity bias. Secondly, in the relevant time period, the number of WRS migrants eligible and in receipt of JSA is negligible. Furthermore, our variable of interest is JSA claimant unemployment, as opposed to broader (ILO) unemployment or employment, and this reduces further concerns of simultaneity bias. Thirdly, we used fairly stringent specifications, where we controlled for omitted variables (two of which are natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection) to some extent through district and month-year fixed effects, supply and demand shifters, lagged working age population growth and native netflow rate. Despite controlling for natives' mobility using two alternative proxies, we found little evidence of an associated bias. Fourthly, we found little evidence of an associated bias when we allowed increased natives' mobility through aggregating the data at successively wider levels. Moreover, our results at the national-occupation level, where natives are no longer geographically-bound, showed no evidence of an associated bias. Finally, Lemos and Portes (2008) reported little evidence of bias correction when exploiting a number of carefully defined instruments using the same sample data on comparable models for the UK. and iy X are labour supply and demand shifters that include the proportion of the total population who are women, young, ethnic minorities and migrants from outside the A8 countries; the lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and parents (along with average number of children). As before, we estimate Equation 2 in firstdifference using GLS and thus district fixed effects were differenced out; time fixed effects are now modelled using year dummies. The interpretation of our coefficient of interest is that a one percentage point increase in the migration rate changes wages by w  %.
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Wage Effects
16 Table 5 shows our results across percentiles of the wage distribution. The UK results in Row 4a are again borrowed from Lemos and Portes (2008) and are provided for comparison and completeness, but the main analysis here focuses on the results for Wales.
Row 1 of the right-most panel shows a significant 4.214 (unweighted OLS)
w  estimate, which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 8 . Controlling for district fixed effects produces a 2.745 significant (GLS) estimate, and further controlling for time fixed effects produces a 3.140 significant estimate. Finally, controlling for other supply and demand shocks produces a 3.378 significant estimate. This suggests that an increase of one percentage point in the migration rate raises average wages by 3.4%. As WRS migrants overwhelmingly concentrate around the 5th and 10th percentiles of 16 One limitation here is that wage data is only available at the yearly level, and as a result, such detailed analysis as the one for claimant unemployment in Sections 3 and 4 was not possible for wages. It is also worth noting that, unlike with the JSA unemployment data, which contained a negligible number of WRS migrants, the ASHE wage data contains both natives and WRS migrants, as discussed in Section 2.1 Thus, it is possible that simultaneity bias, though potentially not too severe, might be more of a concern in our wage models. Our wage estimates were robust, however, when subjected to the same robustness checks to natives' mobility (omitted) variable bias as in Section 4.1.
the wage distribution, we expected to find more adverse (or less favourable) effects there.
Our estimates were indeed smaller at the very bottom than higher up the distribution, but they were insignificant. An important point here is that the minimum wage was in force and increasing throughout the period we study, possibly mitigating or offsetting more adverse wage effects for lower paid workers (see Figure 4) .
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In sum, our main conclusion is that there is little evidence that an increase in the WRS migration rate adversely affected wages in Wales between 2004 and 2006. Our estimates are in line with some evidence in the international literature, where adverse wage effects are small (Grossman 1982; Friedberg 2001; Card 1990 and Carrasco et al. 2008 ), though they are in contrast with other evidence of more adverse wage effects (Borjas 1999 and 2006 
Conclusion
The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 triggered a relatively large, rapid and concentrated migration inflow into Wales. We described and evaluated the impact of this inflow on the Welsh labour market. Accession migrants were overwhelmingly concentrated in low-paid low-skilled jobs in elementary occupations and machine operative occupations in the manufacturing and catering sectors. They are concentrated mainly in 17 Other usual explanations in the literature for insignificant wage and employment effects include factor equalisation as well as industry structure and output mix adjustments. Although neither offers a full explanation (see for example Card 1990 and Lewis 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2006) , a fruitful avenue for future research is more UK based evidence on both fronts. That would help to understand how the internal flows of goods, capital and labour across markets change following migration inflows and how firms alter their production function and production mix in response to the relative labour supply shift. Our unemployment effect estimates were small and in the main insignificant. These estimates were reassuringly robust to a number of specification checks and estimation methods as well as to several different stratifications of the labour market and to different sub-samples of workers.
Our wage effect estimates were positive, small and insignificant at the very bottom of the wage distribution, and were larger higher up, though still insignificant below the median. Estimates for higher paid workers were significant. An increase of one percentage point in the migration rate raises wages of workers in the 60 th (70 th ) percentile of the distribution by 3.9% (5.2%), while it raises average wages by 3.4%.
These results are in line with standard theory, which predicts adverse wages and/or employment effects following a migration inflow that is unbalanced across area or skill. As the accession migration inflow was large, rapid and not balanced across districts or occupations, we expected downward pressure on wages and employment in low-paid lowskilled jobs in occupations and cities where migrants were concentrated. In particular, we expected the wage structure to be affected: competing (complement) workers should have lower (higher) wage increases.
We found evidence that higher paid (complement) workers had larger (positive and significant) wage increases, whereas lower paid (competing) workers had smaller (and insignificantly different from zero) wage increases. One interpretation here is that, relative to higher paid workers, lower paid workers had less favourable (though not adverse) wage increases. Incidentally, more adverse wage effects for lower paid (competing) workers may have been potentially mitigated or offset because they were protected by a concurrently increasing minimum wage. (2006) 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 (1) 0.4% or more but less than 0.5% (0) 0.25% or more but less than 0.4% (7) 0.1% or more but less than 0.25% (11) 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 (i.e. 409 x 24 observations), the number of counties for the UK in panel B row 6a is 49 (i.e. 49 x 24 observations) and the number of governme nt regions (one of which is Wale s) for the UK in panel C row 6a is 12 (i.e. 12 x 24 observa tions). The number of observations for Wales in each panel is respective ly 22 x 24, 7 x 24 and 3 x 24. Thus, the estimates for Wales in rows 1-6 and the estimates for the UK in row 6a of each panel are not directly comparable, though they follow the same pa tte rn of ever broader aggrega tion. Table 2 .
(b) All estimates here to be compared with estimates in row (4) of eac h respec tive panel of Table 2 . Table 2 , except tha tthe numbe r of observations is now 9 x 24. As befor e, time fixe d effec ts are mode le d with month dummies. Occupation fixed effe cts are differenced out. Table 2 , except that the dependent variable is now the a verage and various perce ntile s of the wage distribution a cross years and districts, a nd tha t the number of observations is now 22 x 3. (b) Estimates not available a re indicated by "-". This is due to small sample size and/or non-reliability or non-availa bility of da ta points, as e xplaine d in detail in the "ASHE ta bles" availa ble from the ONS. Even though where e stimates for Wales are missing corresponding estimates for the UK a re reported, c are should be taken as these suffe r the same limitation: they are based on substantially smaller sample size (missing da ta points) and are here reported for completeness only. (c) The estimates for the UK in row 4a of e ach pa nel are borrowed from Le mos and Portes (2008) , where the number of districts is 409 (i.e. 409 x 3 observations).
